By Eric Reeves
January 22, 2014 - It has been three weeks since I asked whether violence had brought South Sudan to the "tipping point" (http://wp.me/p45rOG-1ad). It becomes increasingly likely that without an immediate signing of IGAD’s "Final Draft" of a "Cessation of Hostilities Agreement" by the parties negotiating in Addis Ababa, the question answers itself (for the state of this "Final Draft Agreement," see below; IGAD is an East African consortium of countries, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development). More than half a million people are now internally displaced and approximately 100,000 have become refugees in neighboring countries—and the numbers only grow. In a grim irony, some 5,000 Southern Sudanese have fled to the infamous Kakuma camp in Kenya. In an even grimmer ironer, during the past six weeks humanitarian access has been dramatically compromised by security threats, and this has put many hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese at risk. The Yida refugee camp in Unity State near the border with South Kordofan (Sudan) was so bereft of humanitarian assistance and so dangerous, that thousands who had fled genocide in the Nuba Mountains appear to have returned rather than face the risks of remaining in Yida.
Moreover, the continuing violence—extending further and further throughout South Sudan—makes humanitarian relief difficult if not impossible to deliver in many locations. Displacement in and of itself creates new sources of tension, and has the potential to spread violence even more widely. Humanitarian capacity is ratcheting up rapidly, with UN efforts under the direction of the remarkable and valiant Toby Lanzer. But it remains to be seen whether the increases match human need. The odds seem very much against, especially given the dire straits of so many civilians even prior to the events of December 15. USAID reports that less than half the displaced population has been reached by relief organizations (South Sudan Crisis Fact Sheet #19, January 21, 2014). More generally, the Fact Sheet reports:
According to the UN, active hostilities, attacks on humanitarian workers and assets, and interference with relief activities severely constrain humanitarian access across South Sudan. Unknown armed actors have been responsible for the majority of access incidents, with nearly 50 percent of all reported incidents occurring in Unity State. Violence has resulted in the death of at least three aid workers since December 15, as well as the cancellation of 12 humanitarian flights and the theft of more than 40 humanitarian vehicles. In addition, unknown actors have looted several humanitarian offices and compounds countrywide, resulting in the loss of life-saving relief commodities and the confirmed theft of at least 2,300 metric tons (MT) of food supplies.
That so much of the violence has taken on an ethnic character makes it ever more difficult to imagine any rapid de-escalation, even with a signed agreement on cessation of hostilities. But here it must be borne in mind that this began as a political conflict, and that its ethnic inflection came only subsequently. It is not sufficiently remarked that the large majority of those detained or sought in connection with the putative "coup" were not of Nuer ethnicity. But once the bloodletting began, first in Juba and then elsewhere, the violence fed on itself. The best account of the early days that we have is from the Sudd Institute (Juba), authored by Jok Madut Jok, who was in Juba the entire time he wrote his analysis (published January 4, 2014). He framed his lengthy account with what now seems obvious, but evidently not obvious enough:
What started as a political confrontation between power contenders within the SPLM has now evolved into a military revenge and counter-revenge along Dinka-Nuer ethnic lines, and is threatening to become a civil war, should the IGAD-led initiative for a dialogue fail to produce a quick deal. Getting such a deal as quickly as the people of South Sudan aspire and deserve is very important. Whatever the trigger point of this conflict was, the reality is that the brokers from the (IGAD) countries should push for an immediate cessation of hostilities before discussions on political settlements can begin. http://suddinstitute.org/assets/Publications/Violence-in-South-SudanJok2.pdf
It is critical that we keep in mind this sequencing of the political turmoil and the subsequent violence: too often reporting on the conflict in the South has turned the fighting almost immediately into a "Dinka versus Nuer tribal conflict." There have indeed been gross atrocities based on ethnicity, and these have been as well reported as possible under the circumstances. But we hardly have a clear sense of which ethnic group has suffered more or died in greater numbers, and it simply doesn’t matter, given the gross abuses by both Dinka and Nuer militias, soldiers, and forces like the "White Army." We are now getting images of the destruction, physical and human, from Bor, where the victims have been primarily Bor Dinka. We likely will see similar images coming from Malakal, Bentiu, and elsewhere.
But if the military conflict and increasingly ethnic violence grew with surprising speed out of political clashes, it is incumbent upon all responsible South Sudanese to do—immediately—what they can to halt the violence. The way forward politically is unclear and fraught with dangers; trust is a commodity in very short supply. Many facts and claims are in dispute. It is a moment for groups of men and women of good will to chart a new course for South Sudan, to preside over a process of both reconciliation as well as a reform of governance. The churches have a central role here, both as conveners and mediators. But meaningful progress simply can’t be achieved by military means, and we must wonder about the motives of those who think otherwise.
Here it is important to bear in mind that much news reporting on the conflict has focused in a peculiarly emphatic way on Riek Machar, one of more than a dozen charged with plotting a coup against Salva Kiir’s Government of South Sudan. In many ways it was mere happenstance that Riek was able to escape Juba, while nearly all the rest of his supposed "comrades in arms" were detained. But this in itself in no way suggests that Riek is the leader of "the opposition," a phrase that needs considerable parsing to make sense of, in either political or military terms (see below). Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Riek controls in meaningful fashion even a small percentage of those who continue to fight against government forces—those whom the IGAD negotiators in Addis Ababa delicately refer to as the "Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition." To refer repeatedly to Riek, as many news reports do, as the "leader" of the opposition creates a highly distorted sense of where the grievances lie among those "in opposition."
And unquestionably there are a great number of grievances, felt by many both in government and in the body politic. These grievances in too many cases are too compelling to be ignored, and yet for the past two years and more they have been. Tensions have been building in Juba and within the Government of Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) in particular. Critical problems in governance have not been addressed, and the wholesale changes of summer 2013 only added to the urgency of broader reform in how South Sudan is to be governed. The GRSS remains far too much a version of the guerilla movement that fought a tremendously long and costly civil war with regimes in Khartoum, with great sacrifice by all. But in the absence of a substantial reform in governance, the pervasive and deeply debilitating problem of corruption will continue to thwart real economic progress. Corruption may now be more resourceful, less blatant than in the past; this only argues that the justice system must assiduously search out and hold accountable those who continue to steal from the people. The international community was exceedingly unwise not to make, as a condition of continued assistance, professional, non-Sudanese accounting oversight of oil revenues during the Interim Period (January 2005 to July 2011). The lack of such enabled corruption on a perversely grand scale, and the need for fully transparent accounting is still urgent.
Shortcomings in governance have also led to the entrenchment of any number of figures around the President and in the nation’s ministries who have an interest only in self-enrichment. Accountability for advisory staff and ministerial offices has been missing, even as it is critically important in moving South Sudan forward. Former Vice President Riek Machar was given any number of important portfolios by President Kiir and for the most part did very little with these opportunities. This fact undermines much of his criticism of Salva and the GRSS. Added to the inescapable history of Riek’s role in the civil war, including a great deal more than the Bor Massacre (1991) and his expedient signing of the disastrous Khartoum Peace Agreement (1997), his performance in office hardly inspires confidence. And his refusal to accept President Kiir’s "unconditional" offer of a cease-fire on December 27, 2013 may mark the moment in which pulling back from the precipice of a sweeping, chaotic ethnic violence became impossible. By adding "conditions" (and subsequently more conditions), Riek—simply by virtue of not being among the detainees in Juba—ensured the long delay that has seen so much acceleration in the immensely destructive military violence, including deaths that likely greatly exceed ten thousand at this point, in addition to staggering civilian displacement.
Not all will agree with Jok’s analysis of the political "opposition," but it does seem to point to a key distinction that has been consistently overlooked in reporting:
Our investigation shows that there were two streams of thinking in this quickly forming opposition body, with multiple aspiring leaders. The first stream is the one involving Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior (the widow of the SPLA/M former leader, the late John Garang de Mabior), Pagan Amum Okiech, the sacked Secretary General of the SPLM, Deng Alor Kuol, the former Minister of Cabinet Affairs and a few others, all of whom seem to be committed to a civil political battle to replace the president, whether through some sort of a deal within the party or through the 2015 general elections.
The second stream involves the former Vice President Riek Machar Teny, Taban Deng Gai, the former elected governor of Unity State, who was fired by the president in May 2013 and who is extremely angry for the unconstitutional [this characterization is a matter of continuing controversy—ER] presidential decree that removed him, and a number of senior military officers commanding divisions in Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal. While Taban Deng Gai, an ardent loyalist to President Kiir then, was a recent recruit to this group, Riek had been planning to depose the president by force for quite some time, and was ready to take action if his political alliances with the other group did not bear fruit. Each of the two groups participated in the alliance without revealing what each had in mind, as they were both joined together by a common goal, the removal of President Kiir, but with varying approaches. They were bound to fail given multiple competing leadership aspirations, however.
That Riek was able not only to escape but to secure so rapidly extensive military support and commitments strongly suggests prior consultations. The rapidity with which division commanders in the SPLA decided to throw in their lots with Riek was surprising to many, especially given the difficulty of obtaining secure communications in many parts of South Sudan. The extremely rapid mobilization of Peter Gadet, the raising of the Nuer "White Army" in short order, the slaughter of Dinka civilians in Akobo, Jonglei State (in which two unarmed UN peacekeepers were killed trying to protect these people): all suggest some sort of coordination or planning prior to December 15, 2013. There is, however, no evidence that is not inferential. But the consequences of such rapid coordination of a military opposition from within the ranks of the SPLA meant that we would be witness to the horribly destructive consequences of "symmetric warfare." We hear so much about "asymmetric warfare" in the contemporary world that the massively destructive confrontation of relatively comparable military forces is not something we see often. If the SPLA "loyalists" seem to have various advantages—logistical, weaponry, communications—these have not proved sufficient to bring any sort of rapid conclusion to the fighting with the "opposition." On the contrary, it seems only to spread, reaching areas where the SPLA "loyalists" cannot project military power.
The fate of the oil fields and the infrastructure by which oil is extracted and transported remains uncertain, and the Unity fields have already been shut down, and all Chinese, Indian, and Malaysian technical workers have been withdrawn. There is no compelling reporting on the state in which they left the infrastructure, or addressed the problems created by the heavy paraffin content of this oil. At the same time, Khartoum is under tremendous domestic political pressure from the effects of an imploding economy: lack of foreign exchange currency (Forex) has led to shortages of wheat and ultimately to bread lines and shortages. The same is now true of cooking fuel, whose price spiked in September when the regime was compelled to lift hugely expensive subsidies. Inflation is well over 50 percent, but by how much is unclear. What is clear is that the need for oil revenues has never been so compelling or urgent, and we must wonder how long the regime will wait to effect some sort of military resolution to the crisis. But there is no obvious way in which they can ally with either the GRSS or Riek (who signed the notorious Khartoum Peace Agreement with this regime in 1997). It is likely that "opposition" forces will remain strong in Unity and Upper Nile, the two oil-producing states (Jonglei is not, as has been frequently reported, an oil-producing state).
China for its part is exceedingly unhappy to see the Unity fields shut down; this was the first part of their US$8 billion investment in the Sudanese oil sector, and Sudan now accounts for roughly 7 – 8 percent of China’s offshore oil supply. Beijing also worries about the fields and infrastructure in the northern parts of Upper Nile state, another area that will be difficult for either side to bring under full military control.
The chances for military miscalculation by any of those with a stake in Sudanese oil are great.
Yesterday, there finally appeared a "Final Draft" of IGAD’s "Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A in Opposition)" (at http://wp.me/p45rOG-1at). It is dated January 15, 2014. Moreover, there was no signing date indicated, only "this day X of January 2014, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia." Further, the Agreement is to take full effect only 24 hours after the signing, virtually guaranteeing a last desperate struggle for territory seized (forces are to remain in place, without military re-supply, according to the terms of the Agreement).
But another draft also became available yesterday, and it is only in "draft" form (as opposed to the Final Draft of the cease-fire agreement). Dated January 17, 2014 (http://wp.me/p45rOG-1av), the "Draft Agreement on the Release of Detainees" addresses the issue of the detainees in the custody of the GRSS; presently reported circumstances strongly suggest that the signing of the cease-fire agreement has been made contingent, by the SPLM/A in Opposition, upon the prior signing of this agreement concerning the detainees. Already a week in its "final" form, the cease-fire agreement will apparently languish until this detainees agreement is secured—and we have no idea how long that might be.
[For what it is worth, I was among those who early on called for the release of detainees, a call that now has overwhelming international support. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that elements within the GRSS, with no interest in governance reform or a loss of privilege, are pushing Salva to resist releasing the detainees.]
Meanwhile, fighting continues in much of South Sudan, and the consequences of some of that fighting were revealed in shocking video and photographic images from Bor, a town that changed hands several times, and from which tens of thousands of people fled (see BBC at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25826598). A great many died, most notably women, children, and the elderly attempting to flee to the west, across the Nile; a number of them drowned or were crushed in the surge onto an overcrowded barge. Fighting, with varying degrees of intensity, has been reported in seven of the ten states of South Sudan. But the focus has rightly been on Bor (capital of Jonglei), Bentiu (capital of Unity State), and Malakal (capital of Upper Nile). The latter town has also changed hands several times, and there are competing claims from the GRSS and the SPLM/A in Opposition about who controls it presently. Both sides are well aware that the cease-fire has not been signed, and that there are still opportunities to seize territory and military advantage. Nothing could argue more urgently for the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement.
Again, however, we must not forget the underlying causes of conflict, and the political forces that have loosed such horrifying ethnic violence as we continue to see, with only some areas having a reliable reporting presence. Salva and his government have much to answer for, but this must be via political processes, not through an armed deposing. At the same time, the GRSS must also immediately end its mistreatment of UN personnel, its excessively hostile rhetoric about UN efforts (whatever their shortcomings), and respect international law as it governs camps protecting displaced persons. This abuse has recently increased and in at least one case appears to have violated international humanitarian law.
This complex and troubling state of political affairs has not emerged recently, indeed has long been evident. I and several others who consider themselves "friends of South Sudan" wrote an "open letter" to President Kiir last summer, urging him to move more quickly on a number of fronts: A letter of concern to President Salva Kiir and the Government of South Sudan, from several long-time friends of South Sudan (public release July 8, 2013; text below). The concerns we expressed had all long been communicated privately to the GRSS, but we felt there was too little by way of response. Our concerns have been all too fully realized over the past six weeks.
Perhaps predictably, the (temporary) prominence of South Sudan in the news has generated not only a good deal of weakly informed news reporting, but created a number of "retroactive pundits," who claim either that they predicted what is occurring, or declare that they knew all along that the creation of South Sudan was a grave mistake, fostered by people like me and my colleagues. And yet few would seem to be able to adduce a document such as I offer below. And the notion that somehow the creation of South Sudan was a great mistake seems profoundly uncomprehending of what the people of South Sudan have long wanted. It was no accident that John Garang held out, in the face of immense pressure from U.S. special envoy John Danforth (January 2002), on the demand for a self-determination referendum for South Sudan that included the choice of secession. In the event, the Machakos Protocol was signed in July 2002, and guaranteed precisely such a referendum. And as Garang made repeatedly clear in the lead-up to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and in the months before his tragic death, the burden was on the Khartoum regime to "make unity attractive to the people of South Sudan" during the six-year interim period before the referendum. Given the nature of the regime, this was not simply a tall order, but a challenge the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime never had any intention of rising to.
Indeed, Khartoum soon violated the terms of the interim arrangements in a wide range of ways, and secession became inevitable. Khartoum’s military seizure of Abyei shortly before Southern independence—egregiously violating the Abyei Protocol of the CPA—was only the most conspicuous example of bad faith. There had been many others, and when the chance to vote finally came to the people of South Sudan, there was absolutely no doubt about the outcome. A vote of 99 percent in any election is normally cause for concern; in the case of South Sudan’s self-determination vote, it was entirely representative. During my own time in South Sudan (2003), as the Naivasha negotiations were beginning in earnest, I did not encounter a single person who favored unity with the north.
It really does not matter at this point whether we describe the profound dissatisfaction of important political figures in the SPLM as leading to a coup d’état or not, again a judgment with which Jok Madut Jok begins his January 4 analysis for the Sudd Institute while in Juba. Judging by some of the confidential intelligence I have received on the matter, and what I infer from Jok’s account, there is clearly a great deal we still do not know, key junctures in the first few days that are still blurry. Violence, however, whether directed against those who were thought to be planning a coup, or violence as a response to political grievances are both reprehensible and immensely destructive for the chances of South Sudan moving forward. That a vicious targeting of innocent Nuer civilians in Juba took place is indisputable, and government security forces and elements of the SPLA participated. Many of the accounts that have emerged are utterly shocking in their brutality. Those responsible for these heinous actions must be identified and held accountable.
But Jok, even in the despair he so clearly feels, also speaks with clarity about what must indeed be the hope of all South Sudanese:
[Prospects are even worse] for crafting back the ethnic relations that are the foundation of any viable nationhood. The Dinka killings of Nuer and the Nuer killings of Dinka are no longer in defense of the government or of the rebels respectively, but increasingly due to revenge of previous killings, or perhaps our of fear that one would be annihilated if they do not defend themselves. Every old war ethos that both groups used to restrain themselves by, from respect for the sanctity of women and children’s lives to revering of each other for bravery to thoughts about future reconciliation, have all been thrown out in the immediacy of this survivalist mode that the two groups have gone in for. Where will the voice of reason come from, if the top political leadership of the entire country is either pushing for more killing, in the mistaken idea that it is for their political gains, or it is losing control over this mayhem?
The only hope is for the people of South Sudan to start doing their own thing. Even as the fighting seemed to divide people along ethnic lines, there have been pockets of hope and good will, as some Nuer and Dinka struggle to protect their neighbors and friends. For example, there is a large number of Nuer from the Bul section who have sought refuge in Twic County of Warrap state, along with their cattle, and have been taken in and no harm will come to them from any Dinka. I think these stories of hope can be banked on and expanded to restore our integrity and communal feelings.
A letter of concern to President Salva Kiir and the Government of South Sudan, from several long-time friends of South Sudan (public release July 8, 2013
Mr. Roger Winter
Mr. Eric Reeves
Mr. John Prendergast
Mr. Ted Dagne
June 24, 2013
His Excellency Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President of the Republic of South Sudan
Office of the President
Juba, South Sudan
Dear President Kiir:
We write to you, individually and collectively, as friends of South Sudan—longstanding friends who have committed more than two decades of our lives to the great cause of a just peace for the people of South Sudan. We have lobbied government officials, student organizations, media and nongovernmental groups to build a strong constituency for South Sudan in the United States. We have done our best to highlight the suffering of the people of South Sudan during the long civil war, and to offer our perspectives on the difficult road to completing a true peace.
Some of us have communicated our concerns with you individually and confidentially in the past, always as friends. At this moment, our friendship dictates that we express our concerns about the increasingly perilous fate of South Sudan. From our various vantages, we have all come to conclude that without significant changes and reform, your country may slide toward instability, conflict and a protracted governance crisis. As friends, it is our responsibility to express our serious concerns directly and to offer constructive suggestions for the way forward.
We must first state that over the past several years—but the last six months in particular—South Sudan government security forces have engaged in a campaign of violence again civilians simply because they belonged to a different ethnic group or they are viewed as opponents of the current government.
This violence is shocking and has included rape, murder, theft, and destruction of property. We are particularly concerned about the evidence emerging of abuses by government forces in Jonglei. These terrible crimes occur because government forces believe they have the power to act with impunity.
We joined you in your fight against these very abuses by the Khartoum regime for many years. We cannot turn a blind eye when yesterday’s victims become today’s perpetrators. We were deeply encouraged by the statement by President Kiir on May 17, 2013:
“It is a sad day for South Sudan to see and receive reports about abuses carried out by ill-disciplined elements of our own armed forces. Many of our comrades fought and died to achieve freedom and justice for our people. It is important that we honor that sacrifice.”
At the same time, these atrocities are not isolated incidents but among many deliberate measures taken by soldiers on the instruction of senior commanders and government officials. Some may argue that the failure here lies in the chain of command, but the evidence makes clear that these orders are indeed coming from senior commanders. We urge you to take swift and decisive action against not only those who carried out these heinous acts, but those who gave the orders.
And there must be justice. Crimes by government officials often go unpunished. Many attacks against civilians, including the killing of foreign businessmen, a teacher from Kenya, South Sudanese journalists, and many others, have gone unpunished. We have authoritative reports that government security forces have abused those who allow themselves and their cars to be searched. Many people, including government officials, have faced harassment and have been beaten up by security forces. Again, no one has been held accountable. This inevitably creates a climate of impunity.
There are also many South Sudanese and some foreign nationals languishing in prison, a large number of them facing death sentences. Many of these did not receive a fair trial because the justice system is riddled with incompetence. We strongly urge that the government immediately issue a moratorium on all executions until these cases are reviewed and those convicted given a fair and transparent trial. We further urge you to abolish the death penalty in South Sudan, as more and more countries are doing.
None of this will happen unless the Government of the Republic of South Sudan engages in profound reform. After almost nine years of self-rule, the government is still failing to meet the basic needs of its people. Despite claims that vast sums have been expended on investment in infrastructure, there is very little to show in the way of roads, medical services, and education for millions of South Sudanese who greeted the prospect of independence with eagerness and hope.
Those who have benefited—who have become wealthy by misappropriating government funds—have often sent their families outside South Sudan, their children to private schools abroad, and have obtained the best medical services available in the world. This occurs while ordinary citizens who remain in South Sudan cannot afford even basic health services or modest educations for their children.
Corruption is at the heart of the many problems facing South Sudan. In a remarkably short period of time, the name of your country has become synonymous with corruption. As President Kiir declared in a letter to his ministers and senior officials:
"The people of South Sudan and the international community are alarmed at the level of corruption in South Sudan. Many people in South Sudan are suffering, yet government officials seem to care only about themselves."
And yet to date, not a single government official has been tried on corruption charges. Again, the absence of justice encourages a climate of impunity, and makes halting corruption all the more difficult. This is the light in which we have examined the findings of the World Bank, which after a long investigation presented to the Ministry of Justice—almost a year ago—presents clear evidence of massive corruption. And yet the Ministry of Justice has not yet prosecuted a single individual.
The Office of the President in the past several months has ordered two important investigations and has suspended senior officials, including two Federal Ministers, from office pending the completion of the investigation. Widespread outrage at the extraordinary levels of corruption and at those who are benefiting from that corruption is very high and continues to grow. This is the source of potentially serious civil unrest, just as it was in the Middle East and North Africa over the past few years.
These problems cannot be resolved overnight, but an immediate commitment can be made to re-shape what now seems a dangerous and crisis-filled future for South Sudan.
The Ministry of Justice must be revamped and key personnel who have enabled corruption and crimes against civilians to go unpunished must be removed.
All senior army officials should be put on notice that attacks on civilians are completely unacceptable and will be severely punished up the entire chain of command.
Existing alleged human rights abuses should be fully investigated and prosecuted.
Clear oil infrastructure priorities should be set, especially now in light of a financial picture that is extremely grim. The fact that there are no refineries in the South, no oil storage facilities, and nothing in the way of progress towards a southern oil export route reflects an absence of planning and has left oil revenues at the mercy of the National Congress Party regime. As evidence from the past two years has made clear, the regime in Khartoum is perfectly willing to engage in duplicitous negotiations, commit to agreements in bad faith, and simply renege on agreements whenever it wishes, even if it punishes its own failing economy. All this could have been predicted from past behavior, and must certainly guide thinking going forward.
Schools, medical services, clean water, and roads must top the list of priorities of internal spending. Until the people of South Sudan have ready access to education and health services—services that will need a transport infrastructure—they will be exceedingly vulnerable to disease, and will have little chance to contribute to a modern economy. And without a functional agricultural sector, South Sudan will always be dependent on others.
South Sudan confronts serious external security threats, and will almost certainly do so as long as the current regime controls Sudan. Nevertheless, the army must begin to make plans to be trimmed substantially, made more efficient, and receive training in international human rights law. Security is paramount, but that security will be squandered if the army does not become more responsive to the needs of its people and to its broader obligations to protect the rights of civilians.
The demands here are great, we well understand. But unless you begin to address them now, the tasks will only grow greater. Again, as friends of South Sudan, we urge you to confront these challenges on an urgent basis, and with all possible resolve.
Roger Winter, Eric Reeves, John Prendergast, and Ted Dagne—Friends of South Sudan
CC: The Honorable Riek Machar Teny, Vice President
The Honorable James Wani Igga, Speaker
Sudan Tribune, July 8, 2013: "Friends of South Sudan" go public with call for ’significant changes and reform’ in Juba," http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47220.
Eric Reeves’ new book-length study of greater Sudan (Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 - 2012; www.CompromisingWithEvil.org)
Review commentary at: http://wp.me/p45rOG-15S) Website: www.sudanreeves.org