By Joseph de Tuombuk
October 25, 2009 — One of the best indicators of stability in any country is the ability of its armed forces to stay out of politics at any cost. In United States, there is a respected chain of command in which civilian leadership controls how the military operates. This has been one of the greatest sources of stability in the U.S and other advanced democracies. The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was reputed to be one of the best rebel forces in the world. At the height of its power, it could engage and humiliate Sudan Armed Forces in engagement after engagement. In 1991, it was poised to capture Juba – a feat that would have ushered in peace 14 years earlier. However, with encouragement from Lam Akol and the British wife, Riek Machar and others decided the time was right to split. It was one the greatest strategic blunders in the history of South’s struggle because it gave North the breathing room it needed to plan a better counteroffensive against SPLA.
Among other grievances, their main reason was lack of democracy within the SPLM hierarchy and perceived dictatorial tendencies of the late Dr. John Garang. In any rebel Movement, democracy tends to be last item on the list of objectives. The more pressing issues were to execute a war and worry later about the finer details of democracy. Even with major setbacks emanating from the split, the SPLA was still able to maintain its internal cohesiveness and scored major victories from mid-1990s. The reason for SPLA successful prosecution of war was its ability to remain disciplined rebel force that resisted attempts by political leadership to influence its ranks. There were isolated cases in which some zonal commanders tried to use SPLA forces for their own political survival but these attempts did not present a threat to the integrity of the SPLA. For instance, Arok Thon tried to use this strategy but it failed miserably. Today, however, there is a concerted effort by highly placed political leaders to use SPLA officers from their own tribes as a vanguard to political power.
This is a dangerous precedent that will hamper the ability of the SPLA to carry out its mission of protecting the peace. SPLA is no longer the pure military force that it used to be prior to the integration of other armed groups (OAGs). These soldiers joined SPLA with a totally different mentality and orientation; they were recruited ostensibly to protect tribal warlords. This has not change and can be seen today with behavior of Gen. Paulino Matip’s personal guards (read: army). Gen. Matip is the second in command of all the SPLA land forces in the South. He was given this post on the believe that doing so would bring him into the SPLA’s fold and mitigate the need of an all-out war against SSDF forces. SPLA would have easily taken on the SSDF militia but the cost would have been prohibitively high. Today, however, there is a concerted effort by Riek Machar to manipulate Gen. Matip into unholy alliance as he continues to blatantly pursue his cold-war strategy in an effort to take over the SPLM chairmanship by extension, GoSS presidency.
Riek Machar has not learned from the mistakes of the 1991 split. That split resulted in Bor Massacre in which tens of thousands – perhaps over hundred thousand – innocent women, children and the elderly were murdered in cold blood just for being from the same tribe as Dr. Garang. Like Charles Taylor, Riek Machar should have been indicted to The Hague for his crimes because he was the declared leader of SPLA-Nassir forces. Gordon Kong was one of his henchmen who were directly responsible for murder of prominent Bor Dinka intellectuals in Nassir. In all power struggles between Nuer leaders and the SPLM, Bor Dinka have been the one to pay the unbearable price. There has been no effort on the part of Nuer leaders to sell their alternative policies to all tribes in a peaceful and strategic way. In fact, had they done their homework, they would have found many disaffected Bor intellectuals receptive to their ideas. Many were offended by the arbitrary detention of Maulana Martin Majier Gai and his subsequent assassination. Nuer leaders opted to attack Bor and have never made effort to be remorseful for the Bor Massacre, nor have they made any reconciliation effort. Instead, they are setting in a motion a series of events that are laying the ground work for second Bor Massacre.
We are now seeing exactly the same strategy playing out in Jonglei state. The inter-tribal conflict between Duk of Dinka and Lou’s Nuer is not an isolated case prompted by power struggle in Bor. It is part of a wider strategy to create an environment of fear as the elections approach. With a tacit approval from Riek or his close advisors, a number of Nuer operatives are exploiting Dinka-Nuer historical animosity to create insecurity across the state in an effort to discredit the effectiveness of Jonglei state government and GoSS. When these two governments are considered ineffective, Riek Machar is likely to point this out and say “Kiir has been a failure and now someone else must take over”. Riek allies are also pushing for the removable of Unity state governor, Taban Deng Gai, and replacing him with one of his own allies. What is happening in Unity is more about the lucrative 2% oil revenues than anything else. It is also a clear indication of how Riek is willing to go to undermine Kiir’s appointees.
What is now more worrying is the use of Gen. Matip forces in this scheme. It has been indicated that the security atmosphere in Juba among the top leadership is that of paranoia. No one trusts anyone. This has been demonstrated by the security entourage that accompanies Matip, Riek, or Salva Kiir when they travel outside Juba. Even their respective residences are guarded by menacing-looking tribal forces armed to the teeth. Is this the legacy of hard-won peace? This level of mistrust can be reduced if Riek acts responsibly and stop undermining Kiir at every turn. He needs to back down and wait for his turn. He can challenge Kiir at the ballot box for the chairmanship of the SPLM without resorting to exploiting of Dinka-Nuer uneasy relationship for his political ascendency. What Riek Machar is doing now is going to lead to second Bor Massacre. The only difference is that Bor people are not prepared this time round to be passive victims of Riek’s ambition. There will be a bloodbath on both sides and Riek will have to answer for his crimes.
For South to experience peace and progress on the development front, Riek and others need to act responsively and put their ambition behind that of the country. Riek has to learn from past mistakes and make changes to his approach. He must convince people to see that he is a capable leader and not a tribal chieftain. He needs to come clean on the Bor Massacre and reconcile with Bor people for what untrained white army militia did under his leadership. The SPLA is the force responsible for protecting South. His attempt to use SPLA officers like Gen. Matip will not go unnoticed. What would prevent Matip from overthrowing Riek once he has succeeds in dislodging Kiir from the office? It was Matip who, with help from Sudanese intelligence, undermined and frustrated Riek when he joined NIF government in 1997. These are the things that Riek must think of before deploying such an ill-conceived strategy. If Riek has any agenda that he believe the people of South will embrace, he need to run against Kiir and may the best man win. It is that simple. That is how things should be handled in South. Recruiting SPLA officers from your tribe to champion your politics and provide muscle is a dangerous precedent and will set the country in a dangerous direction. This is what Riek must avoid, even at the expense of his political ambition because the country will be better off in the short and long run.
The author is pursuing graduate work in Geodetic Engineering in US, he can be reached at j.tuombuk@gmail.com
Are Arabs evil simply because they are Arabs?
Tuesday 9 February 2010
By Zechariah Manyok Biar February 8, 2010 — The struggle for freedom is a complicated thing. Oppressed people who struggle for freedom can sometimes turn oppressors if they are not careful in the (...)
When did the SPLM turn separatist?
Monday 8 February 2010
By Charles B. Kisanga February 7, 2010 — In their desperate attempt to mislead Southern opinion, Salva Kiir and the clique around him are going around claiming that they are the champions of the (...)
Maintain Arman candidacy for Sudanese presidency
Sunday 7 February 2010
By Koang Tut Jing February 6, 2010 — The National Congress Party’s latest political maneuvering must not blindfolds the SPLM from looking outside the box. The endorsement of Kiir by the NCP (...)